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A note on terminology
This paper is the fifth in a series of country briefing papers 
released in 2012 about the online support of populist political 
parties and street-based groups in Europe. These papers 
are based on a dataset of approximately 10,667 Facebook 
supporters of these ‘nationalist populist’ parties in 11 European 
countries, which was published in the Demos report The New 
Face of Digital Populism, released in November 2011.1 Further 
papers will be released throughout 2012. 
Throughout this paper, we refer to two primary datasets 
by the following terminology:
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters: The primary data source 
used in this report is a survey of 423 Facebook supporters of 
CasaPound Italia, collected by Demos during July and August 
2011. All references to CasaPound supporters refer to this 
group unless otherwise stated. CasaPound officially changed 
its name to ‘CasaPound Italia’ in 2008, but for the purposes of 
this report we will refer to the movement as ‘CasaPound’. 
 · Populist parties and movements (PPAMs): In order to draw 
comparisons between CasaPound Facebook supporters and the 
Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties elsewhere 
in Europe, throughout this paper we refer to the data set 
collected for The New Face of Digital Populism. This includes 
10,667 Facebook supporters of nationalist populist parties and 
movements in 11 Western European countries. We refer to these 
as PPAMs throughout.
We also draw on European-wide survey data from 
Eurobarometer surveys and the European Values Study to make 
comparisons where possible. These studies are cited where 
relevant below.
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Executive summary
The last decade has witnessed a growth in nationalist 
populist parties and movements in many countries 
in Western Europe. The majority of these parties and 
movements are defined by their opposition to immigration 
and multiculturalism, and concern for protecting national 
and European culture. On economic policy, they are often 
vocal critics of globalisation and the effects of international 
capitalism on workers’ rights. This is combined with ‘anti-
establishment’ rhetoric used to appeal to those who are 
disillusioned with mainstream political parties, the media 
and government. Often called ‘populist extremist parties’ 
or ‘the new right’, these parties do not fit easily into the 
traditional political divides. 
One of the most difficult to classify of these groups is the 
neo-fascist political and cultural movement CasaPound, which 
was originally founded in Italy in 2003 but was formalised in 
2008 under the name CasaPound Italia. In this report we refer 
to the group under its old name, CasaPound. 
CasaPound’s ideas, policy positions and rhetoric are 
grounded in the social legislation of Italian Fascism of the 
1930s and 1940s. In line with a long tradition developed in the 
Italian and French far-right ideological debate,2 the political 
message of CasaPound is built on a so-called ‘metapolitical’ 
view of fascism, that sees fascist ideas as beyond the traditional 
left–right political categories.3 
Unlike other far-right movements and parties in Europe 
for which immigration is the key issue, CasaPound’s policy 
positions cover a range of economic and social areas. Its 
primary concern, which is at the centre of its name, symbol 
and activities, is the ‘housing right’ for Italian citizens. 
CasaPound’s discourse also emphasises state sovereignty, 
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support for public control of the banks and the protection of 
small enterprises, and opposition to globalisation.4 While its 
supporters reference and oppose immigration and multicul-
turalism, their arguments against immigration are unconven-
tional compared with other far-right-wing organisations (for 
example, they argue that immigration is bad for the immi-
grants themselves, as it is a form of ‘modern slavery’). 
CasaPound emphasises modes of direct activism (for 
example, organising street protests, demonstrative actions, 
political campaigns and street marches) over more formal 
methods of political engagement. The group’s political cam-
paigns have aimed to initiate laws, promote referenda and 
directly influence the national political debate over different 
topics related to housing, Italian workers, the public austerity 
programme and the importance of the traditional family unit. 
The group also promotes and organises cultural and sport 
activities that are aimed at the militants and core sympathisers 
of the movement.
As with other far-right groups, the current economic 
crisis in Europe — and the difficult position of Italy in the 
crisis — has provided CasaPound with fertile ground for 
spreading its ideas. The crisis has allowed the movement to 
strengthen its criticisms of international capitalism as well as 
eurozone fiscal policy. It has also argued against the weaken-
ing of the nation state and the increasing power of unelected 
technocrats. 
Events in 2011 and 2012 have reflected negatively on 
CasaPound and underline the potentially violent nature of the 
movement or those affiliated with it. In December 2011, a 
CasaPound sympathiser (renamed by the newspapers ‘the 
Italian Breivik’) killed two Senegalese street vendors and 
wounded three others before killing himself in Florence. Very 
recently, in July 2012, CasaPound was again at the centre of the 
political debate for the aggression by one of its militants 
against the artistic director of a futuristic festival in Viterbo.5 
This report presents the results of a survey of 423 re-
sponses from Facebook fans of CasaPound. It includes data on 
who they are, what they think, and what motivates them to 
shift from virtual to real-world activism.
In July 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals who were 
supporters of three CasaPound-related groups on Facebook. 
On clicking the advert, individuals were redirected to a survey, 
which they were invited to complete. The survey and adverts 
were presented in Italian, and were then translated back into 
English for the purposes of this report. The data were then 
weighted in order to improve the validity and accuracy of any 
inferences made about the online population. Although online 
recruitment in social research is widespread, self-select recruit-
ment via social network sites brings novel challenges. Because 
this is an innovative research method, with both strengths and 
weaknesses, we have included a methodology section in an 
annex to this report.
Results 
CasaPound’s support base cannot be adequately understood 
through Facebook alone, and many supporters are not 
on Facebook. The findings in this report refer specifically 
to CasaPound Facebook supporters — an important, but 
specific, sub-group of its overall support base. As we set out 
in the methodology, this study is more exploratory than 
comprehensive, but does shed important and useful light on this 
group; it is the first report, to our knowledge, that explores in 
depth the political and social views of CasaPound supporters. It 
is with these caveats that the results are presented.
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters are overwhelmingly male and 
generally quite young. 
Nearly nine in ten (87 per cent) are male, which is the highest 
proportion out of all PPAMs included in our research; 62 per 
cent are between the ages of 16 and 30. 
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters are willing and active 
demonstrators, but few describe themselves as formal members. 
More than four in ten (44 per cent) reported attending or 
participating in a street demonstration or protest, which is 
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significantly higher than the PPAM average and the Italian 
public in general. However, only one in five reported being 
a formal member of CasaPound. This might reflect the wider 
appeal that CasaPound cultural activities hold for people, 
who might be inclined to ‘like’ CasaPound or attend an event, 
but not go so far as to join the group formally. 
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters tend to be pessimistic about the 
effectiveness of politics, but are more optimistic than the average 
PPAM supporter. 
Again, more than four in ten (43 per cent) agreed with the 
statement that politics was an effective way to respond to their 
concerns, which was higher than the PPAM average of 35 per 
cent. CasaPound supporters were also more optimistic than 
the two other street-based movements we surveyed, the English 
Defence League and Bloc Identitaire. 
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters’ top concerns were the economy and 
immigration, contrary to other PPAM supporters. 
CasaPound supporters were much more likely than the 
average PPAM supporter to be concerned about the economic 
situation, unemployment and corruption. Moreover, only 5 per 
cent cited Islamic extremism as a top concern, while Islamic 
extremism was the second most cited concern (at 25 per cent) 
across all of the PPAMs we surveyed. 
 · In their own words, CasaPound supporters cited the group’s values 
and integrity rather than the protection of cultural identity. 
When asked why they supported CasaPound, supporters were 
less likely than supporters of other PPAMs to offer responses 
that were categorised as pertaining to ‘identity’ (6 per cent vs 
18 per cent), ‘anti-Islam’ (0 per cent vs 10 per cent) and ‘anti-
immigration’ (1 per cent vs 18 per cent); instead, they were 
more likely to cite the ‘integrity’ of the organisation (17 per cent 
vs 9 per cent).
 · CasaPound Facebook fans are no more pessimistic than the average 
Italian about whether Italy is on the right track or not. 
Both Facebook supporters of CasaPound and the Italian 
general public are very pessimistic about Italy’s future. 
The great majority (92 per cent) of CasaPound’s supporters 
disagreed either a little or entirely with the statement ‘Italy is 
on the right track’, but according to a Eurobarometer survey 
in 2011, only 8 per cent of the general public said that Italy was 
going in the right direction, while 65 per cent said the wrong 
direction and 21 per cent reported neither one nor the other. 6
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters have very negative attitudes 
towards the European Union. 
Compared with the Italian general public, CasaPound 
supporters were significantly more likely to cite the following 
when asked about their views towards the European Union: 
loss of cultural and national identity (63 per cent vs only 12 per 
cent of the Italian general public); waste of money (48 per cent 
vs 16 per cent); bureaucracy (33 per cent vs 7 per cent); and not 
enough control at external borders (46 per cent vs 9 per cent).
 · CasaPound Facebook supporters have very low levels of trust in the 
government, the EU, political parties, trade unions and the press. 
Only 11 per cent of CasePound Facebook supporters reported 
trusting the government (compared with 34 per cent of the 
Italian general public) and 15 per cent reported trusting the 
EU (compared with 52 per cent of the Italian general public). 
Of particular note is the remarkably low level of trust in the 
press — only 5 per cent had confidence in the press, compared 
with 25 per cent of Italians overall. Political parties also scored 
very low on the trust measure — just 8 per cent of CasaPound 
Facebook supporters trust them.
Implications
Our task in this report is to illuminate the phenomenon 
of online supporters of CasaPound and present the results 
objectively. We do not offer lengthy recommendations because 
formulating a response is a task for Italian citizens and 
politicians. This is perhaps a more difficult task given the fluid 
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and dynamic way many people now express their political 
preferences online, and the way social media allow for groups 
and individuals to network and mobilise faster than ever. We 
hope this research can inform that task.
What seems clear from our research is that CasaPound is 
appealing to a significant number of Italians — particularly 
young Italians — through a combination of right and left-wing 
ideology, symbols and methods. A number of young people 
view CasaPound’s direct approach to politics — through street 
protests, occupying abandoned buildings and political 
stunts — and emphasis on culture and music as an exciting 
alternative to traditional politics. 
Although CasaPound’s Facebook supporters differ from 
supporters of other similar parties surveyed for this research 
(for example, on their emphasis on economics and housing as 
opposed to Islam and immigration), in many ways they have a 
good deal in common. They tend to be young, politically 
motivated men who have very low levels of trust in mainstream 
politics and mainstream institutions, such as the government, 
political parties, the EU and the press. 
Maintaining or restoring trust in political institutions is 
an extremely important challenge for most of Western Europe. 
In our Europe-wide survey we found that online supporters of 
PPAMs who are also involved in offline politics appear to be 
more democratic, have more faith in politics, and are more 
likely to disavow violence than other supporters of PPAMs. 
While the causal relationship between these attitudes is not 
clear, there is still evidence to suggest that encouraging more 
people to become actively involved in political and civic life, 
no matter how detestable people find their views (assuming 
they are within the parameters of incitement of hatred and 
racism legislation), is an important way forward. 
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1   Background
 
 
CasaPound 
The history of CasaPound can be traced back to 1997 when 
Gianluca Iannone, the future president of the group, helped 
start the rock band ZetaZeroAlfa (ZZA). ZZA wrote neo-fascist 
songs with titles like ‘Red Roses from the Blackshirts’ 7 and 
found an audience among like-minded young people who did 
not feel represented by prominent right-wing parties, such as 
the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). MSI was formed in 
the 1940s by former supporters of Mussolini and later, in 1995, 
split into two separate factions: the more moderate Alleanza 
Nazionale, and the smaller, but radical, Movimento Sociale-
Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT). In 2006, Iannone and his group 
(who were referring to themselves as CasaPound) decided 
to join MS-FT, but left in 2008 after Iannone was expelled 
following frictions between the party’s rigid structure and his 
demand for flexibility.8 
Following his departure from MS-FT, Iannone formally 
set up ‘CasaPound Italia’ as an extra-parliamentary ‘social 
association’ for disenfranchised, right-wing youths. However, 
the group had been organising demonstrations for years 
previously. In 2002, CasaPound occupied a state-owned 
building in Rome and established the so-called ‘Casa Montag’. 
Initially, Casa Montag did not have a real political and 
communitarian aim but was rather a centre for people to meet, 
socialise, play music, and discuss political and social issues. 
In 2008 the group squatted another building in the centre of 
Rome, which now serves as its current official headquarters. 
These ‘occupazioni non conformi’ (‘unconventional squats’) 
functioned as community centres and served as the ideological 
pillars of the movement. The squatting of Casa Montag and 
subsequent building occupations had the primary goal of 
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hosting Italian families that lost their houses, and protesting 
against the rising rents in Rome and related real estate specula-
tions: the group’s slogan was ‘rent is usury: stop the increasing 
costs of living’. This concern for housing is the core of 
CasaPound’s ideology and policy, and is reflected in the 
group’s name as well as its use of the turtle as its main logo: 
‘The turtle is one of the few living beings which is fortunate 
enough to have with them the house.’9
In addition to the Italian term for ‘house’, the name of 
the movement is an explicit reference to the American poet 
Ezra Pound, who adhered to the Repubblica Sociale Italiana 
(Italian Social Republic) and supported Mussolini. Ezra 
Pound’s daughter, Mary De Rachewiltz, has repeatedly gone 
to court to try and stop CasaPound from using her father’s 
name, claiming: ‘[CasaPound] are a nuisance.’ 10 Particularly 
influential to CasaPound is Pound’s analysis and critiques 
against usury, capitalism and Marxism, in addition to his 
emphasis on the right to housing. 11 While CasaPound borrows 
a significant amount of its ideology from Italian Fascism, and 
the likes of Mussolini and Pound, it attempts to disassociate 
itself from anti-Semitism and racism.12 
Is CasaPound a populist movement? 
CasaPound is one of the more ambiguous of the far-right 
populist groups that we have surveyed as part of our 
Populism in Europe series. In the words of the group’s 
founder, Gianluca Iannone, CasaPound seeks to transcend 
the traditional right–left-wing divide: according to Iannone, 
describing the group as ‘right wing’ is ‘a bit restrictive’.13 
Its ideology and approach to political engagement combines 
both left- and right-wing ideas and symbols. However, it is 
explicit and open about its support for Mussolini and Italian 
fascism of the 1940s. CasaPound’s emphasis on nationalism, 
privileging ethnic Italians for welfare services and direct 
take-to-the-streets approach provide strong grounds for 
including it in our research into ‘new right’ European street-
based movements. 
The Italian press has referred to CasaPound as ‘Third 
Millennium Fascists’ — a term its members have come to use 
themselves — underlining their continuity with the past and their 
desire to resurrect fascist ideas and apply them to current social 
problems. According to their vice president, Simone Di Stefano, 
the group sees Mussolini as a ‘point of reference, a vision of the 
state and the economy and the concept of sacrifice’.14 Its 
economic policy is heavily influenced by Mussolini and includes 
a strong belief in state interventionism, and an appeal to 
renationalise communications, transport, health and energy. 
However, CasaPound argues that Mussolini’s racial laws were 
‘a mistake’. According to Di Stefano, ‘[CasaPound] believe in 
the national community and the Jews in Italy are part of that. 15
As mentioned above, CasaPound is also heavily influenced 
by Ezra Pound’s criticism of usury and support for the right to 
housing. Iannone has called usury ‘the worst thing… the head 
of the octopus… which creates unemployment, debt and 
threatens the future of our children.’  16 CasaPound argues for a 
form of ‘social mortgage’ (mutuo sociale) — a housing policy that 
would guarantee all Italian workers the right to own a property: 
the right of home ownership is crucial to the movement’s 
message. Alongside this, CasaPound believes in the ‘traditional 
family’ as the basic unit of the nation even if, officially, it is not 
homophobic. One example of this was the campaign entitled, 
‘Tempo di essere madri’ (‘It’s time to be mothers’), which advo-
cated lowering the amount of working hours for mothers, 
without affecting their pay. It has also opposed Italy’s austerity 
programme, most notably in the campaign ‘Ferma Equitalia’ 
(‘Stop Equitalia’). Equitalia is the public company in charge of 
the collection of taxes and the symbol of the austerity move-
ment for Italians. It has been (and still is) at the heart of the 
Italian political debate after the introduction of the first 
austerity measures by the government of Mario Monti. Since 
the beginning of 2012, different bases of Equitalia have been 
the target of several bomb attacks by unknown political groups.
One distinguishing feature of CasaPound is its explicit 
emphasis on physical activity and confrontation. The function 
and importance of sport activities and physical 
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confrontation — more broadly conceived as a ‘cult of the 
body’ — is described in detail by Domenico di Tullio (the 
lawyer of CasaPound) in his novel Nessun Dolore (‘Painless’).17 
CasaPound offers a range of sport activities to its core mem-
bers and sympathisers, including trekking, speleology, rugby, 
combat (box and martial arts), parachuting, water polo, 
diving, horse-riding, motor-riding and hockey.18 One of the 
most well-known aspects of CasaPound supporters, which 
CasaPound defines as a ‘sport’, is the ‘cinghiamattanza’ or 
massacre belt that is often seen in the moshpits at ZZA gigs, 
where male participants whip each other with their belts often 
until bleeding.19 An example of this can be seen in the video 
for ZetaZeroAlfa’s song ‘Cinghiamattanza’ on YouTube.20 The 
video includes references to Fight Club; according to Di 
Stefano, the practice is ‘a bit like Fight Club, a way to risk 
pain, to confront yourself in a way society does not allow.’ 21
As mentioned above, CasaPound combines traditional 
right- and left-wing concerns, approaches and symbols. For 
example, despite an open devotion to Mussolini, it regularly 
organises events to celebrate famous left-wingers such as Che 
Guevara or Peppino Impastato (a militant communist who died 
fighting against the mafia in Sicily). These ambiguities are also 
reflected in the group’s culture and music: the official radio 
station of the movement, Radio Bandiera Nera, broadcasts 
traditional right-wing music (like the singer Massimo Morselli) 
as well as the anarchist songs of Fabrizio De Andrè. The images 
used by the group include the so-called fascio littorio (the symbol 
of Mussolini’s ideology and regime), as well as posters of Corto 
Maltese or the leftist singer Rino Gaetano. These ambiguities 
also exist at the level of the political tactics: in contrast to other 
contemporary extreme-right groups — which rarely resorted to 
‘squatting’ as a political practice — CasaPound made use of 
squatting — a traditional left-wing activist tactic — as the pillar 
of its political engagement. 
CasaPound supporters say they are not ‘racist’, but are 
against immigration because of its impact on wages and 
houses; not anti-Semitic, but anti-Israel vis-à-vis Palestine; not 
homophobic, but supporters of the ‘traditional family’. The 
ambiguity is symbolised by the location of CasaPound’s 
headquarters in Rome’s Chinatown. In Iannone’s opinion, this 
is what elevates CasaPound’s meta-politics above those of the 
English Defence League: ‘the EDL is going on the ground of 
the clash of civilization. For me and CasaPound, this provokes 
a kind of disgust.’ 22 
These ambiguities account for CasaPound’s appeal, 
particularly among young people, as they strive to appear as 
non-conformist as possible. CasaPound recommends to its 
core members ‘non-conformist authors’, ‘non-conformist 
music’, ‘non-conformist theatre’, ‘non-conformist events’ and 
so on. The anti-conformism is a strong pillar in the language of 
the organisation and it is fairly well known among the Italian 
audience: an Italian comedian, Caterina Guzzanti, created a 
caricature of the ideal-typical militant of CasaPound who uses 
the term ‘non-conformist’ gratuitously to comedic effect.
CasaPound’s approach also appears to help them maintain 
legitimacy ‘on the street’ and act as an interlocutor between 
Italian right-wing youth and the world of media and politics, 
especially on social issues. This strategy of ‘entrismo’ is common 
for the ‘plural right’, as groups can retain an outsider status, 
while still having the scope to influence institutions and policy. 23 
While immigration is not portrayed as a priority for 
CasaPound, their rhetoric concerning this issue is similar to 
that of other far-right populist groups like the Danish People’s 
Party. However, CasaPound’s arguments against immigration 
are mainly economic in nature, as opposed to cultural, as is the 
case with the majority of other far-right populist groups. 
CasaPound argues that it is not against immigrants per se, but 
rather criticise immigration as a forced result of globalisation. 
They claim that globalisation creates a ‘multirazzista’ (multira-
cist) society, where the rising number of immigrants prevents 
the state from protecting their own citizens, leading to indi-
vidual citizens’ rights being diminished.24 Furthermore, they 
argue against immigration from the perspective of the immi-
grants themselves, arguing that it is ‘modern slavery’, which 
must be countered by ‘the people [remaining] masters in their 
own country’.25
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Organisational structure and approach
The most interesting feature of CasaPound is its approach to 
politics and non-conventional forms of engagement. Through 
music, sport, presentations and the sense of community 
created out of social spaces, CasaPound’s central tenet is one of 
cultural production and social solidarity. It has established 15 
libraries, 20 pubs and eight sporting associations to help build 
this solidarity, and offers opportunities for boxing, football, 
rugby and many other sports.26  According to Iannone: 
‘politics for us is a community… it is fundamental to create 
a web of supporters, rather than focusing on elections’. By 
focusing on culture, social work and sport — rather than explicit 
politics — CasaPound has been able to widen its support base 
and strengthen collective social ties between members.27 
CasaPound also uses public ‘showpiece’ protests in order 
to get its message across. For example, it campaigned against 
rising house prices by hanging mannequins off bridges to 
represent the families strangled by mortgages, as well as 
invading the Big Brother house, claiming it represented ‘an 
insult to those Italians who are victims of the housing crisis’.28 
As recently as 31 August 2012, CasaPound occupied the EU 
headquarters in Rome and dumped bags of coal in front of it, 
to express solidarity with Italian miners.29 
CasaPound also has a distinct youth wing that was 
founded in 2006 called Blocco Studentesco, which gained 
11,000 votes in the last student elections in Rome.30 Blocco 
Studentesco operates in high schools and lyceums, but mainly 
in universities. Blocco Studentesco devotes itself primarily to 
education policy, promoting public against private education, 
and is against the private funding of research, meritocracy, 
and any increase in the number (and amount) of scholar-
ships.31 Blocco Studentesco was responsible for violent clashes 
in Piazza Navona, when — armed with batons covered in 
Italian flags — its supporters incited riots against leftist 
students in October 2009.32
CasaPound and social media
As an organisation with a strong youth following and an 
emphasis on unconventional forms of political engagement, 
CasaPound is expert in the use of social media. It uses 
social media to garner support and help appeal to a young 
demographic. The language they use tends to be based on 
slogans, incitements and abstract concepts, rather than 
articulated ideological positions. This is exemplified through 
their use of music and in particular the music of ZZA. They 
use self-produced media innovatively, and run an online 
radio, an online TV station, two magazines, one main 
website and dozens of satellite websites. They have also held 
over 150 conferences throughout Italy and use cutting-edge 
graphic design.33 
At the time of writing (summer 2012), CasaPound Italia 
has 2,380 followers on Twitter; on Facebook, CasaPound Italia 
had 25,361 ‘likes’ and ZetaZeroAlfa had 11,462 ‘likes’. The 
CasaPound leader, Gianluca Iannone, had 11,692 ‘likes’, and 
the website claims the movement has 4,000 official members 
and thousands more supporters across the country. 
Conclusion
CasaPound is one of the more interesting and ambiguous 
populist groups to emerge in Europe in the past five years. 
It has a ‘cool’, charismatic leader, an emphasis on social 
collectivity, youth, fun, sports and community work, and 
has the veneer of progressivity. Yet, hidden behind this is 
the shadow of right-wing extremism: the group emphasises 
physical confrontation and the comments sections and forums 
of websites are full of extreme views on immigration, anti-
Semitism, identity politics and nationalism. 
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2   Who are CasaPound 
Facebook supporters?
This chapter presents the socio-economic, age and gender 
data of CasaPound Facebook supporters. Where possible, 
we present this information in the context of broader Italian 
society and make comparisons to similar groups in Western 
Europe, as presented in the Demos report The New Face of 
Digital Populism.34
Demographics and geography
Using Facebook’s publicly available advertising tool it is 
possible to identify the age and gender of all Italian users 
of Facebook, as well as the basic demographic information of 
Facebook members who express a preference for CasaPound. 
Across the country as a whole, Italian Facebook users are 
slightly more likely to be male than female (54 per cent vs 46 
per cent, n=20,731,520), but among CasaPound’s Facebook 
supporters, 87 per cent were male (n=16,200). This gender 
imbalance towards males is shared with other PPAMs across 
Western Europe, but CasaPound supporters were even more 
likely to be male than other PPAMs. 
CasaPound supporters are generally fairly young: 62 per 
cent were aged 16–30, compared with an average of 63 per cent 
this age among PPAMs, and an average of 51 per cent of 
Facebook users across the general populations of all countries 
surveyed (see table 1). 
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Table 1  Age of CasaPound Facebook supporters (n=16,200)
Age group CasaPound total  
(%, national statistics 
in brackets)
Western Europe PPAMs  
(%, national statistics 
in brackets)
16–20 25 (18) 32 (19)
21–25 22 (17) 19 (17)
26–30 15 (14) 12 (14)
31–40 20 (25) 17 (21)
41–50 11 (16) 12 (15)
51+ 6 (10) 8 (13)
We cannot precisely pinpoint where CasaPound 
Facebook supporters are located, but we asked survey respond-
ents what was the nearest large city to their location within 
50km. Supporters live in a wide geographic area throughout 
Italy, particularly near Rome and Milan. More than a quarter 
(26 per cent) are from or around Rome, 19 per cent from Milan, 
11 per cent from Bologna, 9 per cent from Naples and Torino, 
and 8 per cent in Florence.
Education and employment
The proportion of CasaPound Facebook respondents with 
only a school qualification or diploma is 62 per cent, which is 
significantly higher than the pan-European PPAM figure of 
45 per cent. This may at least in part be due to the youth of 
CasaPound. However, a significant number of CasaPound’s 
online supporters reported being either current or former 
university students: just under a quarter (22 per cent) said their 
highest level of education was university (table 2). 
Table 2    Highest educational attainment of CasaPound Facebook 
supporters (n=423) 
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Diploma 61 71 66 42 62
Università 23 13 19 38 22
Qualifica professionale 10 14 10 17 11
Did not answer 6 2 5 3 5
CasaPound Facebook supporters were slightly more 
likely to be unemployed than the average Italian citizen (11 
per cent vs 7.9 per cent when the survey was undertaken), but 
less likely to be unemployed than supporters of other PPAMs 
(14 per cent). However, given the high number of young people 
who completed this survey — and the levels of unemployment 
in Italy among under 30s, which according to ISTAT is 36 per 
cent for those between 15 and 24 years old — it is unlikely that 
they are more likely to be unemployed than the average for 
their age profile. As noted, a significant number of supporters 
under 30 were classified as students (35 per cent) (table 3). 
Table 3    Employment status of CasaPound Facebook supporters (n=423) 
(national statistics in brackets) 35
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Employed 57 62 51 89 58
Unemployed 11 9 12 6 11 (7.9)
Student 29 25 35 0 29
Did not answer 3 4 2 5 2
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Membership and involvement
To determine the extent to which CasaPound Facebook 
supporters are involved in offline activity, we asked 
respondents whether they were a formal member of CasaPound 
and whether they had participated in a demonstration or street 
protest in the past six months (table 4). As CasaPound is not 
a political party contesting elections, we did not ask online 
supporters if they voted for CasaPound. We did however ask 
them who they voted for in the last election (the list of parties 
we explicitly asked about included the Il Popolo della Libertà 
(PdL), Partito Democratico (PD), Unione dei Democratici 
Cristiani e di Centro (UDC), Lega Nord and Italia dei Valori 
(IdV)): just over a quarter reported voting for the People of 
Freedom Party of Silvio Berlusconi (PdL); 7 per cent voted 
for Lega Nord; 35 per cent selected the ‘other’ category; and 
almost 30 per cent reported not voting (which could include 
many of the younger supporters).  
We found that, true to the direct action take-to-the-streets 
spirit of CasaPound’s methods, online supporters were 
significantly more likely than average PPAM supporters to 
have taken part in a street demonstration (43 per cent vs 26 per 
cent) (table 4). While data from the European Social Survey on 
this question does not include Italy, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the percentage of the Italian public who have 
participated in a street demonstration is significantly lower 
than 44 per cent. However, we know from the European Values 
Study that 9.4 per cent of the Italian population has ‘occupied 
factories or buildings’ before.36 
Interestingly, this high level of motivation to take to the 
streets does not extend to formal ‘membership’ of the move-
ment. Only one in five supporters (20 per cent) said they were 
formal members of the movement (table 4), which is signifi-
cantly lower than the PPAM average (32 per cent). This 
highlights the extent to which CasaPound can recruit periph-
eral supporters to street protests, often through the possibility 
of confrontation and excitement. 
Table 4   Offline involvement of CasaPound Facebook supporters  
   (n=423) 
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Formal members of 
CasaPound
20 19 21 18 20
Taken part in a march or 
demo last 6–12 months
45 34 46 31 43
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3  Social and political 
concerns
We asked CasaPound Facebook supporters a number of 
questions about their social and political views, trust in 
people and political institutions, and opinions about the 
future for themselves and their country. Where possible, we 
compare results to a Eurobarometer survey and the European 
Values Study 37 in order to make meaningful comparisons 
with national level data. We also draw on comparisons with 
supporters of PPAMs throughout.
Top two biggest concerns
When asked to rank their top two social and political concerns 
from a list of 18 current issues, the most common responses 
from CasaPound Facebook supporters were about the economy 
and immigration. They were much more likely than the average 
PPAM supporter to be concerned about the economic situation 
(32 per cent vs 16 per cent), unemployment (24 per cent vs 13 
per cent) and corruption (12 per cent vs 4 per cent) (table 5). 
They were also far less likely than the average PPAM supporter 
to be concerned with Islamic extremism (5 per cent vs 24 
per cent). The fact that economic issues rank comparatively 
highly and Islamic extremism so lowly among the concerns of 
CasaPound supporters distinguishes them from the supporters 
of similar parties across Western Europe. 
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Table 5   The top two biggest concerns of CasaPound Facebook  
   supporters (average PPAM score in brackets)
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Economic situation 31 37 31 36 32 (16)
Immigration 27 25 28 20 26 
Unemployment 24 27 25 22 24 (13)
Corruption 11 17 11 18 12 (4)
Rising prices 11 8 10 12 10
Politics and voting
We asked CasaPound Facebook supporters to tell us their 
views about the effectiveness of democracy in order to gauge 
the level of disillusionment they feel with mainstream political 
channels. In general, Facebook supporters of CasaPound are 
pessimistic about the effectiveness of politics, but are not too 
disillusioned to vote. 
Only 16 per cent of CasaPound Facebook supporters 
agreed with the statement ‘it does not matter who you vote for’ 
(table 6), which is the same percentage as the PPAM average. 
Thus, CasaPound Facebook supporters are not too dispropor-
tionately bitter and disenchanted to vote when compared with 
supporters of PPAMs in other countries, although CasaPound 
is not a political party itself. 
Table 6  Extent to which CasaPound Facebook supporters agree that  
   it does not matter who you vote for (n=423)
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30  
(%)
Over 30  
(%)
Total  
(%)
Agree entirely 10 11 9 14 10
Agree a little 7 0 6 5 6
Indifferent* 13
Disagree a little 13 24 16 6 14
Disagree entirely 53 63 53 59 54
*Note: Overall, 13 per cent of respondents selected the response ‘indifferent’, 
while 3 per cent did not answer the question.  
While, CasaPound Facebook supporters overall remain 
cynical about the extent to which politics is an effective means 
to respond to their concerns, they are more positive than the 
supporters on average of other PPAMs we surveyed: 43 per 
cent of supporters agreed with the statement ‘politics is an 
effective way to respond to my concerns’ compared with 35 per 
cent of supporters of other PPAMs (table 7). It is also worth 
noting that they are more optimistic than the supporters of the 
other street-based movements we surveyed: the English 
Defence League (of whom 35 per cent agreed with the state-
ment) and the Bloc Identitaire (of whom only 20 per cent 
agreed with the statement).
Table 7   Extent to which CasaPound Facebook supporters agree that  
   politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns (n=423)
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30  
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
Agree entirely 17 9 15 21 16
Agree a little 27 26 28 24 27
Indifferent* 12
Disagree a little 14 22 14 19 15
Disagree entirely 23 29 25 19 24
*Note: Overall, 12 per cent of respondents selected the response ‘indifferent’, 
while 6 per cent did not answer the question.  
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Personal and national optimism
The majority of CasaPound Facebook supporters were highly 
pessimistic about their country’s future: 83 per cent disagreed 
either a little or entirely with the statement ‘Italy is on the 
right track’, while 8 per cent agreed with the statement (table 
8). When compared with results given in the Eurobarometer 
survey of autumn 2011, which asked a similar question, we see 
that Facebook supporters of CasaPound are no more or less 
pessimistic than the general public: both are very pessimistic 
about Italy’s future. Only 8 per cent of respondents to the 
Eurobarometer (autumn 2011) question ‘at the present time, 
would you say that, in general, things are going in the right 
direction or in the wrong direction, in Italy?’ said it was 
going in the right direction, while 65 per cent said the wrong 
direction and 21 per cent reported neither one nor the other.38 
These high levels of pessimism mirror those of supporters 
of other PPAMs (of whom only 10 per cent agree that their 
country is on the right track). 
Table 8   Extent to which CasaPound Facebook supporters agree that Italy 
   is on the right track (n=423)
Male  
(%)
Female  
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30  
(%)
Total 
(%)
Agree entirely 2 5 1 5 2
Agree a little 6 11 6 9 6
Indifferent* 2
Disagree a little 18 6 16 17 16
Disagree entirely 66 74 70 56 67
*Note: Overall, 2 per cent of respondents selected the response ‘indifferent’, 
while 7 per cent did not answer the question.   
When asked whether they thought their own life would 
be better or worse in 12 months’ time, CasaPound Facebook 
supporters were slightly more optimistic than the PPAM 
average (29 per cent of CasaPound supporters thought their 
lives would be better, compared with 27 per cent of PPAM 
supporters). Interestingly, compared with the Italian general 
public, CasaPound Facebook supporters were more likely than 
the Italian public to think their personal situation would 
change (either for the better or the worse). Almost a third of 
CasaPound supporters thought their life would be better, while 
another third thought it would be worse and a little over a 
third (39 per cent) thought it would stay the same. Members 
of the Italian public, on the other hand, were less certain either 
way — with 55 per cent reporting it would stay the same com-
pared with about a fifth thinking it would be better and a fifth 
thinking it would be worse (table 9). 
Table 9  CasaPound Facebook supporters’ personal outlook for the next 12 
   months (n=423) (national statistics in brackets) 39
Male  
(%)
Female  
(%)
Under 30  
(%)
Over 30  
(%)
Total  
(%)
Better 30 26 33 14 29 (19)
Worse 28 28 27 35 28 (18)
Same 39 39 38 45 39 (55)
Note: Overall, 4 per cent of respondents did not answer this question.
Attitudes toward the European Union
Consistent with the majority of respondents from PPAMs in 
other Western European countries, CasaPound Facebook 
supporters are more likely to have negative opinions of the EU. 
As seen in table 10, compared with the Italian general public, 
when asked about their attitudes towards the EU, CasaPound 
supporters were significantly more likely to cite loss of cultural 
and national identity (63 per cent vs only 12 per cent of the 
Italian general public); waste of money (48 per cent vs 16 per 
cent); bureaucracy (33 per cent vs 7 per cent); and not enough 
control at external borders (46 per cent vs 9 per cent). 
Compared with supporters of other PPAMs, CasaPound 
supporters were more likely to cite the loss of cultural and 
national identity (56 per cent was the PPAM average), but less 
likely to cite waste of money and not enough control at 
external borders (59 per cent and 58 per cent were the PPAM 
average scores, respectively) (table 10). 
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Table 10  CasaPound supporters’ attitudes towards the European Union  
   (n=423) (national statistics in brackets) 40 
Male  
(%)
Female 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Loss of cultural and 
national identity 41
62 67 64 55 63 (12) 
Waste of money 47 50 49 41 48 (16) 
Not enough control at 
external borders
47 46 47 42 46 (9) 
Bureaucracy 34 29 33 34 33 (7)
Freedom to work, 
study and travel 42
32 32 32 28 32 (26)
Trust in institutions and people
Trust in other people, as well as political and social 
institutions, is generally considered to be an important 
indicator of social capital in democratic societies. CasaPound 
Facebook supporters display very low levels of trust towards 
most political and social institutions compared with their 
national compatriots (table 11). 
Only 11 per cent reported trusting the government and 15 
per cent reported trusting the EU compared with 34 per cent 
and 52 per cent, respectively, of the Italian general public. Of 
particular note is the remarkably low level of trust in the 
press — only 5 per cent had confidence in the press, compared 
with 25 per cent of Italians overall. Political parties also scored 
very low on the trust measure — just 8 per cent tend to trust 
them. Nevertheless, a high proportion of supporters think it is 
important to vote (see above). 
Trust in institutions is also low for CasaPound supporters 
compared with the average of other PPAM supporters. They 
have lower levels of trust towards the justice and legal system 
and government than the average for other PPAM supporters, 
with 11 per cent of CasaPound supporters trusting both 
institutions, compared with 30 per cent and 20 per cent, 
respectively, of other PPAM supporters.
Similarly to other PPAMs across Europe, the army is the 
only institution in which CasaPound supporters have compara-
ble levels of trust to the general public, with 73 per cent of 
CasaPound supporters trusting it compared to 78 per cent of 
the general Italian public. 
Table 11  Extent to which CasaPound supporters and the Italian general  
   public trust institutions (n=423) 
Institution Tend to trust Tend not to trust
CasaPound 
supporters 
(%)
Italian 
public  
(%) 43
CasaPound 
supporters  
(%)
Italian  
public  
(%)
Army 73 78 22 28
Police 49 68 46 34
Religious 
institutions
25 42 69 43
European Union 15 52 80 38
Justice and the 
legal system
11 X 85 52
Government 11 34 85 70
Political parties 8 24 87 77
Trade unions 7 X 88 56
The press 44 5 25 87 51
Asked whether they are inclined to trust other people in 
general, 26 per cent of CasaPound Facebook supporters said 
they thought that most people can be trusted (table 12). This is 
around the average figure for PPAM supporters (33 per cent), 
and for the Italian general public (31 per cent). 
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Table 12  Extent to which CasaPound supporters agree that people can  
   be trusted (n=423) (national statistics in brackets) 45
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
Over 30 
(%)
Under 30 
(%)
Total  
(%)
In general most  
people can be trusted
27 24 24 37 26 (31)
In general most people 
cannot be trusted
57 73 61 46 59 (69)
Indifferent or 
do not know*
16 3 15 17 11
*Note: Overall, 11 per cent of respondents selected the response ‘indifferent’, 
while 4 per cent did not answer the question.  
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4  Why do people support 
CasaPound online?
 
The preceding chapter provides some indication of why 
CasaPound Facebook supporters are drawn to the movement, 
but we also wanted respondents to describe what motivates 
them in their own words. This chapter presents our findings on 
respondents’ answers to an open-response question asking why 
they supported CasaPound, to which 192 people responded. 
Table 13 provides a breakdown of the different categories 
that we used to code and classify the responses, which we 
placed in multiple categories if deemed relevant. We discuss 
the most frequently cited categories below, and give examples 
of some of the responses we received.
Table 13  Reasons given by CasaPound Facebook supporters for joining  
   the party, by gender and age (n=192) 46
Male 
(%)
Female 
(%)
16–
20 
(%)
21 
–25 
(%)
26 
–30 
(%)
31 
–40 
(%)
41 
–50 
(%)
51+ 
(%)
Total 
(%)
Group values 50 56 52 48 49 49 53 61 51
Other 23 22 31 19 19 22 20 17 22
Integrity 16 27 15 17 25 17 15 22 17
Disillusionment 13 10 7 13 13 19 15 4 12
Identity 6 0 5 3 6 10 5 0 6
Anti-immigration 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1
Economic 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Anti-Islam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Anti-EU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Federalism or 
secessionism
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Supporters of CasaPound were most likely to cite ‘group 
values’ as the main reason for joining the movement; just over 
half did so. This tends to be a very general affirmation that the 
individual agrees with CasaPound’s position. Responses in this 
category suggest that supporters are not just ‘protesting’ 
against other parties, but rather have a firm sense of identify-
ing with the movement itself. 
Beyond that, CasaPound supporters were less likely than 
supporters of other PPAMs to cite identity (6 per cent vs 18 per 
cent), anti-Islam (0 per cent vs 10 per cent) and anti-immigra-
tion (1 per cent vs 18 per cent). They were equally likely to cite 
disillusionment, and more likely to cite ‘integrity’ (17 per cent 
v9 per cent). 
Group values
Respondents were classified in this category when they had 
cited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, beliefs, 
aspirations or ideas of CasaPound as reasons for supporting 
the party. This was the most popular set of answers, with 52 per 
cent of responses qualifying for this classification. Examples 
include a general support for what the party stands for overall, 
with many respondents citing both the ideals of CasaPound as 
well as their practical approach towards achieving them: 
Because of their originality of ideas, their integrity and spontane-
ity, their true social commitment — because of their concrete 
helpfulness towards those in need. Therefore: they don’t just do 
‘media walks’ but act truly. They make facts and not only words. 
The present Italian political system is obsolete.47 
Because it’s the only movement that is really outside the schemes and 
that works in a concrete and disinterested way for a better world.48
Many of my political ideals are like those of CasaPound.49
I think it’s the only one that is really close to my ideologies.  
I’m a Mussolinian.50 
Integrity 
The second most popular response (not including ‘other’) 
was ‘integrity’. Responses were placed in this category when 
respondents had explicitly mentioned that CasaPound could 
be trusted to speak the truth or believed that the group 
was consistent in its convictions. Many respondents spoke 
admiringly of their honest, straightforward approach: 
In the name of ideas and ideals that are not for sale; because 
CasaPound truly and actively participates in political life, because 
its politics [are] made by young people for the sake of young people, 
but most of all for the sake of Italy and not to the detriment of it; 
(because CasaPound) is born and acts on the streets and not on 
armchairs. But most of all because my ideals are not for sale and 
CasaPound does not stoop to compromises, at least for now!!! 51
Because I think that it’s a political movement for people created  
by people.52
Disillusionment 
Disillusionment with mainstream political parties and 
institutions is often posited as a reason for the popularity 
of PPAMs. Responses were flagged for this category when 
they expressed disenchantment with current institutions, 
parties and ideas. Many respondents felt, in particular, that 
CasaPound was the only movement currently generating new 
and creative political approaches: 
Because it’s the last evidence of a social right-wing.53
Because in such a depressing Italian panorama, they are the only 
ones who, from time to time, manage to face problems with a 
creative approach.54
CasaPound is the only revolutionary answer to the political dullness 
of these days. It’s life in a land of dead people! 55
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Other 
The ‘other’ category was particularly popular for supporters 
of CasaPound, and suggests that the reasons people get 
involved is extremely varied. Examples ranged from curiosity 
to social interaction: 
Love for nature and animals.56
Out of curiosity.57
Because it’s the best development that fascism has had since the 
1920s.58
Because it’s an association that doesn’t have prejudices, it’s not 
racist, it has good proposals and I find myself at ease with its 
militant components.59  
51
Annex: Methodology
 
The methodology employed for the collection and analysis 
of this data is set out in detail in The New Face of Digital 
Populism.60 We therefore limit this section to CasaPound 
specific issues.
For The New Face of Digital Populism we collected data 
from Facebook supporters of nationalist populist political 
parties or street-based movements drawn mainly across 
Western Europe. We ran a Facebook advert targeted at 
supporters of all parties and/or party leaders’ Facebook pages 
over the summer of 2011. Each advert invited Facebook 
supporters of the group in question to click on a link, which 
redirected them to our online survey.
Our campaign ran over a three-month period, with no 
single advert being available for more than six weeks. On 
clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital 
survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, which set 
out the details and purpose of the survey along with an 
invitation to take part. The size of target population varied 
from country to country, depending on the size of the 
Facebook membership of the group in question. Table 14 gives 
the details of the data collected for the survey on CasaPound.
Table 14  Data collected for survey on CasaPound
Date of 
survey
No of 
specific 
Facebook 
interest 
groups 
targeted
Size of 
population 
targeted
No of 
unique 
impres-
sions
Total 
Facebook 
link  
clicks
Total 
survey 
responses
Final 
data 
set
Casa-
Pound 
Jul–Aug 
2011
3 16,200 2,203,079 1,803 478 423
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The ‘unique impressions’ column lists the number of 
unique occasions the advert was displayed on the target 
audience’s Facebook sidebar. The click per impression ratio 
was relatively stable, at just under 0.1 per cent. The click to 
survey completion ratio was around 26 per cent. This non-
response rate may be the result of some respondents deciding 
not to take part in the survey on reading the consent form. 
Our method to correct for non-response rates is discussed in 
the full methodology given in The New Face of Digital Populism. 
The size of the final data set was lower than the number of 
surveys completed because we removed incomplete surveys.
Data analysis and limitations
We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is a 
popular mode of communication for supporters of many of the 
groups and parties we surveyed.
In order to increase the validity of our results, we applied 
a post-stratification weight, using the known demographics of 
the online population to correct the sample’s balance of gender 
and age in line with the makeup of the group as a whole. To do 
this, we gathered background data on the composition of 
CasaPound’s Facebook group membership using Facebook’s 
advertising tool (which is freely available for any user to 
access). We gave each participant a weighted value on the basis 
of the prevalence of their demographic profile (age and gender) 
in the population at large. Although we achieved demographic 
representativeness — which can correct for systematic age or 
gender related bias — it is possible certain attitudinal self-
selection biases exist, because this was a self-select survey. It is 
with this caveat that the results are presented.
While the use of a post-stratification weight is an improve-
ment on the use of unweighted data, it cannot be automatically 
claimed as a reliable basis for making inferences about the 
offline group. The use of social network surveys is subject to a 
well-known technical and methodological critique focusing on 
the nature of self-entry interest classification on Facebook, the 
lack of content reliability on social networking sites, and the 
lack of internet access and usage in the broader population, all 
of which are capable of biasing the results of the survey.
Therefore, we take care not to claim at any point in the 
text that our sample represents or reflects the official views of 
the group, or indeed of its offline membership.
Throughout the paper, we compare the CasaPound 
Facebook survey results to the pan-European study results 
presented in The New Face of Digital Populism.
In the background chapter, we undertook a short 
literature review of Italian and English language material.
In chapter 2, the gender and age of each of the groups 
in question were collected directly from the publicly available 
Facebook group level data using the advertising tool men-
tioned above. This provides the most accurate results on the 
Facebook membership for each group. Results related to 
education, employment and involvement in the group are 
based on our weighted results.
In chapter 3 we give weighted results and provide 
comparative data where they are available from the 2008 
European Values Study or a Eurobarometer survey. Where the 
questions are not worded identically, or there were additional 
answer options, this is expressly identified.
Chapter 4 is based on the analysis of an open text 
question about why individuals joined CasaPound. This open 
question allowed respondents to answer as they wished. An 
Italian translator coded the responses. We reviewed the 
content of the responses and created nine main categories for 
the responses, with a tenth category ‘other’. Responses could 
fall into multiple categories. We removed data relating to 
respondents who were not supporters of CasaPound.
Ethical considerations
As this research focused on adolescents over the age of 16, no 
Criminal Records Bureau check was necessary; consequently, 
none was sought. Similarly, it was not necessary for us to 
obtain informed consent from participant parents or guardians 
as Social Research Association ethics guidelines suggest 
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such clearance should not be sought and is not required 
where investigating participants aged over 16. We sought and 
gained individual informed consent from all participants, 
who agreed to a consent statement presented at the start 
of the survey — failure to sign acceptance of this statement 
prevented them from participating further in the research. 
Although we targeted the survey only at people aged over 16, 
a small number of individuals stated they were under 16 when 
responding to the question about age. We immediately deleted 
data relating to these people.
We stated on the Facebook advert that we were represent-
ing Demos, and were undertaking a survey of Facebook 
members of the group in question. On clicking the advertise-
ment link, the participant was redirected to the survey landing 
page. On that page we pointed out that leaders of each group 
had been informed about the survey. Before running the 
survey, Demos emailed each of the groups in question to let 
them know about the survey. On the landing page we also 
stated that we would be letting the party in question know 
about the results before they were made public. Before release, 
we emailed the parties and groups in question with the results 
where they pertained to their members.
We did not brief participants fully on the study’s aims 
before completing the survey in order to avoid the exhibition 
of demand characteristics. We provided only a broad overview 
of the research at the start of the survey, and gave more 
detailed information on the project’s aims only after the last 
question had been completed. We provided the contact details 
of the lead researcher to all participants to cover the eventual-
ity that they had questions not covered by the debrief notes, 
but few participants made use of it.
We told participants that they could withdraw from the 
research at any time before completion, as part of a preface 
presented alongside the consent statement. Later we reminded 
them of this right when they completed the survey via a 
paragraph in the debrief notes, offering the possibility of 
immediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants opted 
to withdraw in this way.
We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant to 
the storage and handling of data; all data were kept digitally 
encoded in an anonymous format, and we did not store any 
data capable of identifying any participants.
We prepared for the eventuality that the research 
uncovered information with serious security implications, 
particularly relating to participant support for violence; we 
took precautions to absolve the researcher of moral responsi-
bility towards the disclosure of information to agents of the 
criminal justice system by ensuring that the survey did not ask 
for precise details of acts of violence or illegal political protest. 
In order to preserve participant confidentiality (the deliberate 
exclusion by data capture systems of IP addresses) we removed 
from the researcher the means to identify and incriminate 
individual participants.
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Nationalist populist parties and movements are growing in 
support throughout Europe. These groups are known for their 
opposition to immigration, their ‘anti-establishment’ views 
and their concern for protecting national culture. Their rise 
in popularity has gone hand-in-hand with the advent of social 
media, and they are adept at using new technology to amplify 
their message, recruit and organise.
One of the most difficult to classify of these groups is 
the neo-fascist political and cultural movement CasaPound. 
CasaPound emphasises modes of direct activism (for example, 
organising street protests, demonstrative actions, political 
campaigns and street marches) over more formal methods 
of political engagement. Unlike other far-right movements 
and parties in Europe for which immigration is the key issue, 
CasaPound’s policy positions cover a range of economic and 
social areas with its primary concern being the ‘housing right’ 
for Italian citizens.
This report presents the results of a survey of Facebook 
fans of CasaPound. It includes data on who they are, what 
they think, and what motivates them to shift from virtual to 
real-world activism. It also compares them with other similar 
parties in Western Europe, shedding light on their growing 
online support, and the relationship between their online and 
offline activities. This report is the sixth in a series of country 
specific briefings about the online support of populist parties 
in 12 European countries, based on our survey of 13,000 
Facebook fans of these groups.
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